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Conceptualising Contemporary Retail Divestment:  
Tesco’s Departure from South Korea 
 
Abstract 
In this article, we critically analyse UK retailer, Tesco’s September 2015 decision to sell its highly 
profitable South Korean subsidiary Homeplus to private investors. For over a decade since 
market entry in 1999, Homeplus had grown steadily to achieve a market-leading position through 
a process of strategic localization in which Tesco’s global business practices were selectively 
adapted to meet the specific needs of the South Korean market. Against this backdrop, we 
explain the exit decision through theorising the dynamic intersection of home and host market 
factors that developed contemporaneously from 2010 onwards. On the one hand, worsening 
market conditions and financial pressures in a post-crisis UK domestic market drove Tesco to 
refocus on its home operations and, ultimately, identify saleable assets to offset mounting debts. 
On the other hand, steadily growing resistance within the South Korean market from 
competitors, regulators, labour and consumers caused sales growth to stall and then start to 
decline. Our analysis contributes to the economic geography literature on retail divestment by 
conceptualising the relational process of divestment decision-making that encompasses the 
intersection of home and host market pressures as well as conditions across the wider portfolio 
of subsidiaries. The research is particularly distinctive in its profiling of this coevolution of 
drivers, and in distilling the different ‘domains’ of host market contestation. The analysis also has 
wider significance in the context of the broader literatures on economic globalization that have 
tended to focus heavily on processes of expansion and market entry and far less on the instances 
of failure and exit that are an integral and inevitable part of these wider dynamics.  
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Conceptualising Contemporary Retail Divestment: 
Tesco’s Departure from South Korea 
 
Introduction: an unexpected turn of events? 
On 7th September 2015, the UK grocery and general merchandise retailer Tesco released a 
statement on its website relating to its South Korean operations. In the statement, Dave Lewis, 
the Chief Executive of Tesco since July 2014, stated the following:  
“After a highly competitive process, we are announcing today the proposed sale of 
Homeplus, our business in the Republic of Korea. This sale realises material value for 
shareholders and allows us to make significant progress on our strategic priority of 
protecting and strengthening our balance sheet.  
I would like to thank all of our Homeplus colleagues for their dedication, professionalism 
and service to our customers, which has resulted in the creation of a great business. I am 
confident that the agreement we have reached with MBK Partners presents an exciting 
opportunity for their continued success.” (Tesco, 2015) 
On face value, the sale of Homeplus (Tesco's South Korean subsidiary) to a group of 
investors led by Asian private equity fund MBK Partners for approximately £4.2bn might make 
little sense. Indeed one commentator described it as ‘selling the jewel in its crown’ (MoneyWeek, 
2015). Since entering the South Korean market in 1999 through a joint venture with Samsung’s 
then troubled distribution arm, for the large part Homeplus expanded rapidly over the next 15 
years in terms of revenues, employees and store numbers – as Table 1 details – with Tesco also 
increasing its initial 81 percent stake to secure complete ownership by 2011. By February 2014, 
Homeplus was Tesco’s largest foreign operation in term of sales, with annual revenues of 
approximately £5.8bn and operating profits of £500m. It accounted for 55 percent of Tesco’s 
Asian revenues, 30 percent of international sales and 9 percent of its global total (i.e. including 
the UK). Homeplus also operated 139 shopping malls adjacent to its hypermarkets, in which 
over 6,500 tenants leased space, while its modern grocery market share of 12.7 percent was 
second only to the Shinsegae Group, owner of the E-Mart banner (Morgan Stanley, 2015). While 
these do not seem like the characteristics of a struggling subsidiary, the above quotation and 
Table 1 do contain hints of the underlying processes at work in terms of the mention of 
‘protecting and strengthening our balance sheet’, and with respect to the tailing-off of Homeplus’ 
growth since 2011. 
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Previous accounts in the literature have characterised Homeplus as a successful example of 
retail globalization, describing how the firm was able to effectively ‘strategic localize’ its 
operations to meet the needs of the South Korean market and how, over time, it was able to 
progressively ‘territorially embed’ itself successfully in the host economy and society (Coe and 
Lee, 2006; 2013). Key elements of the success were seen to be the use of local management 
executives – including the mercurial founder S. H. Lee who retired in 2014, the successful 
management of the joint venture with Samsung which created the perception, initially at least, 
that Homeplus was a local retailer, and the adoption of a hybrid corporate culture that blended 
knowledge of South Korean consumption practices with Tesco’s efficient business practices (see 
Wood et al., 2016, on how these traits were reflected in Tesco’s Asia expansion more generally). 
The attributes, in turn, engendered a deepening territorial embeddedness across three domains: 
format innovations designed specifically for the South Korean market; developing relationships 
with the local supply base; and expansion into a wide range of new services (e.g. telecomm and 
financial services) along with a range of attempts to build a stronger relationship with South 
Korean consumers in areas such as online shopping and environmental sustainability, even 
extending to establishing ‘cultural centres’ in its largest stores. 
 
How then, against this backdrop, do we explain the decision of Tesco to exit from the 
South Korean market in late 2015? Our account is positioned against the broader literature on 
retail globalization and, more specifically, work that has sought to explain the continued 
prevalence of market exits even in a period since the late 1990s that overall has seen a strong 
aggregate trend of retail globalization (Coe and Wrigley, 2017). We use the Homeplus case to 
make three interlinked conceptual contributions to this literature. First, and as the Chief 
Executive’s statement alludes, Tesco’s decision was heavily shaped by home market 
considerations and financial drivers, in the context of a challenging post-2008 competitive 
climate, and a specific corporate crisis that unfolded in 2014. These factors need to take more 
analytical prominence in the literature. Second, we outline the emergence of growing resistance 
to the operations of Homeplus across four key domains – notably re-regulation, local 
competition, waning consumer confidence and increased labour resistance – which has 
intersected with other aspects of South Korean retailing such as an ageing population, saturation 
of large retail formats, and very high levels of online sales and served to slow and start to reverse 
Homeplus’ hitherto strong growth trends (Morgan Stanley, 2015). These interconnected host 
market domains demand greater recognition in the literature. Third, and most saliently, we build 
upon the Homeplus case to argue that retail divestment decisions need to be theorised as 
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occurring at the dynamic nexus of both home and multiple host country conditions; prioritising 
just one element of this nexus results in an incomplete picture of events. In the Tesco/South 
Korea case, this necessitates revealing the other assets that were considered for sale before the 
final divestment decision was reached. 
 
For this study, we conducted an in-depth case study of Tesco’s departure from South 
Korea, employing both qualitative and quantitative data. In South Korea, we relied on in-depth 
interviews with a research fellow and two retail academics focused on the broad background of 
grocery retail divestment and the specifics of the institutional background. In order to uncover 
the mechanics and decision-making context of the South Korean divestment, we also conducted 
semi-structured interviews with six leading UK based food retail analysts – four of whom were 
employed as equity analysts for investment banks. Equity analysts were selected for inclusion in 
the sample based on their profile within the financial market and their presence at invited 
analyst/investor meetings with the retailer. Drawing on analyst insights is increasingly employed 
within economic geography given the privileged access such actors enjoy to senior management 
within listed firms, which include ‘off-the-record’ discussions with executives stemming from 
‘industry-conference “break-out” sessions, site visits, regional tours, dinners with management, 
and so on’ (Wrigley et al., 2003: 385). Given the sensitive nature of the content of these 
discussions, our respondents were assured of their complete anonymity in any publishing of 
results. Mindful of the situated nature of analyst knowledge (Wood et al., 2017), our primary data 
was complemented with − and triangulated by − archival analysis, and content analysis of news 
articles, for instance on conflicts between Tesco and local small merchants. We also used 
longitudinal data from both the Korean Chain Store Association and Tesco’s annual reports, 
along with a wide range of other secondary sources. Therefore, our insights are both empirical 
and conceptual and derive from working ‘backwards and forwards between theory and the 
empirical world in a reflexive manner’ (Clark, 2007: 191). 
 
The paper unfolds over three main sections. First, we explore the limits of the existing 
literature on retail transnational corporation (TNC) divestment, and outline three productive 
lines of conceptual development in relation to dynamic home and host country factors. Second, 
we present a short account of Tesco’s recent struggles in its home UK market relating to 
overlapping competitive and reputational factors that drive an appetite for divestment, before 
exploring the decision-making process of divestment to explain why attention shifted to the 
Homeplus operations in preference to alternative candidates across the retailer’s global 
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operations. Third, we profile the growing resistance that Tesco Homeplus operations in South 
Korea have experienced across the four domains mentioned above. Overall, Tesco’s sale of an 
apparently strong subsidiary ultimately needs to be understood in the context of these evolving 
and interconnected home and multiple host market environments. 
 
Theorising retailer market exit dynamics 
Since the early 2000s, a vibrant multi-disciplinary literature on retail globalization and its 
multifarious impacts has emerged (see Coe and Wrigley, 2009, for an overview). While 
agricultural economists, economic sociologists and cultural studies scholars have played their 
part, at the core has been the work of management scholars and economic geographers keen to 
understand the increased intensity and geographical extensity of retail globalization processes 
from the late 1990s onwards. We can use Deloitte’s annual Global Powers of Retailing surveys to 
provide an insight into these processes. Whereas in 2005, international sales accounted for only 
14.4 percent of the total sales of Deloitte’s top 250 retailers, it had increased significantly to 23.4 
percent by 2010, with the figure dropping slightly to 22.8 in 2015. Moreover, the average number 
of countries of operation of these firms increased from 5.9 in 2005, to 8.2 in 2010, and 10.1 in 
2015.1  
 
However, while the general trend has been for a progressive globalization of leading 
retailers in terms of both revenues and numbers of countries of operation, there is increasing 
evidence at the individual firm and market level that retail globalization has been far from the 
inevitable procession that some erroneously predicted in the early 2000s. Instead, and rather than 
some retailers proving to be ‘good’ at international expansion and others less so, the reality is a 
complex mosaic of success and failure as retailers from different home contexts have striven to 
adapt to widely varying host economy conditions. The study of retailer market exit, or 
divestment, has accordingly become a growing strand of the retail globalization literature since 
the early 2000s. This has aligned with the wider imperative of developing longitudinal, dynamic 
accounts of what happens to retail TNCs in host markets after the initial point of entry, the 
predominant focus of early management studies of the topic (Coe, 2004). In successful cases, 
this may simply be a matter of facilitating subsequent growth through further investment and/or 
reinvesting profits (Dawson, 2003). In other cases, however, retailers may be forced to undertake 
a relative or absolute withdrawal of investment from foreign markets. In line with a networked 
                                                          
1 For the very largest retailers, these figures were significantly higher, with Deloitte’s top ten firms accruing 
28.7 percent of revenues from international sales across an average of 15.7 markets in 2015. 
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view of the retail TNC (Wrigley et al., 2005), there is thus growing recognition that investments 
are actively and constantly being switched between national subsidiaries based on decisions 
about relative returns and profitability.  
 
There are by now three intersecting lines of research into retailer divestment. First, there 
have been efforts to construct and analyse datasets of investment and divestment patterns, 
charting considerable levels of divestment activity even during periods of rapidly increasing retail 
foreign direct investment (e.g. Alexander et al., 2005; Burt et al., 2004). These early, broad-based 
studies demonstrated that market exit was the predominant form of divestment, that divestment 
patterns were geographically highly variable, and that the majority of divestments were small 
scale in terms of store numbers and tended to occur within 5-10 years of entry.  
 
Second, the past fifteen years have seen the emergence of a battery of firm case studies 
of divestment events and processes, largely focused on the fluctuating fortunes of European and 
US retailers such as Ahold (Wrigley and Currah, 2003; Palmer and Quinn, 2007), Home Depot 
(Bianchi and Arnold, 2004), Marks and Spencer (Burt et al., 2002; Jackson et al., 2005; Mellahi et 
al., 2002), Sainsbury (El-Amir and Burt, 2007), Target (Yoder et al., 2016), Tesco (Palmer, 2004) 
and Wal-Mart (Christopherson, 2007; Kim, 2008; Gandolfi and Strach, 2009). These studies have 
provided many important insights of theoretical significance. Wrigley and Currah’s (2003) 
account of Ahold’s travails in Latin America in the early 2000s, for instance, depicted retail 
internationalisation as a highly contested process that poses significant organisational challenges 
for the retail TNC, while Christopherson (2007) provided a rich institutionalist account of Wal-
Mart’s struggles to transfer a US model of ‘lean retailing’ to a German context with very different 
governance rules, leading to its exit in 2006. 
 
Third, there have been attempts to stand back from these individual cases and theorise 
the retail divestment process in more general terms (e.g. Alexander and Quinn, 2002). This work 
has revealed that market divestment can take a wide range of forms, including: closure of a 
number of stores or channels; financial restructuring in terms of the ownership and/or profit 
expectations of a subsidiary; organisational restructuring with respect to retail processes or 
formats; and/or total exit from a particular territory. In another important contribution, Burt et 
al. (2003) identified four interrelated reasons for divestment, namely market failure, where the 
host market does not develop according to expectation, competitive failure, wherein domestic 
competitors are stronger than expected, organizational failure, reflecting the problems of 
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transferring business processes to the host market, and business failure, in which wider corporate 
factors make continued investment untenable. While instructive in parsing different dimensions 
of divestment processes, such conceptualizations have hitherto not done enough to frame the 
dynamic interplay of home and host market conditions that underlie all divestment events. 
 
Against this backdrop, we seek here to develop three particular lines of argument. First, 
the home country context – in terms of wider business conditions and relationships with 
financial markets – needs to be given more prominence in theoretical terms. Indications can be 
found in existing studies which have suggested that the decision to divest may not necessarily 
reflect weakness within foreign operations but may be a proactive strategy based on conditions 
in the home market and/or decisions about how resources may be invested more efficiently 
elsewhere within the corporation (Wrigley and Currah, 2003; Jackson et al., 2004). In a similar 
vein, Cairns et al. (2008, 2010) have contrasted ‘corporate crisis’ divestment – reflecting a lack of 
stability or focus amongst leadership and problems which stimulate a need to refocus on the 
domestic market – and ‘positive restructuring’ divestment characterised as an ongoing process of 
reinvention which may lead to new formats or approaches better suited to internationalisation. 
These elements were brought into sharp relief by a post-2007/8 crisis context in which 
European retailers in particular have faced increasingly challenging consumer conditions in their 
home market (and wider European region). In this context, Wood et al. (2017) draw on the 
financialization literature to highlight the importance of retail TNC managers successfully 
managing their relationships with home country financial analysts in relation to the nature and 
extent of foreign operations. Leadership changes, leading to shifting priorities and strategic 
reappraisals of foreign operations, are often an integral part of these hitherto under-studied 
dynamics. 
 
Second, we argue that there is a concomitant need for a greater focus on the developing 
host market conditions or what Coe and Wrigley (2017) term the ‘domains of resistance’ (see 
also Kim and Hallsworth, 2016) to retail TNC market expansion, which may develop to such a 
degree that they trigger, or significantly influence, divestment decisions. As Durand and Wrigley 
(2009: 1551) note, ‘transnational retailers are not simply institution takers; rather, they contribute 
actively to influencing institutional change in the host economies they enter’. Four such domains 
of resistance are apparent from the existing literature. The first concerns processes of 
deregulation and re-regulation. Retail globalization processes were in part driven in the late 1990s 
by deregulation of retail foreign direct investment across a range of emerging markets, allowing 
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for significantly increased investment and ownership by foreign capital in the retail sector 
(Wrigley, 2000). In the period since, however, it has become clear that the initial removal of trade 
barriers has been superseded by new sets of regulatory barriers specifically designed to protect 
domestic retailers. Nguyen et al. (2014: 378) use the term ‘re-regulation’ to denote these 
subsequent developments, and highlight the ways in which they ‘differentially impact on the 
operational costs of the multinational retailers and therefore become restrictive in terms of trade 
and investment’. Re-regulation is usually driven by controversy over the desirability of retail 
TNC-driven change, the perceived impacts on local small retailers, and retailer-supplier tensions 
as supply systems are radically and quickly transformed by inward investors.2  
 
The second domain relates to resistance to TNC expansion from two distinct segments 
of the pre-existing retail structure. On the one hand, in the formalised sector, indigenous retailers 
have been able to rapidly and successfully imitate the organizational innovations and best 
practices of retail TNCs, whilst at the same time mobilising local institutional knowledge and 
social/political networks to erode their competitive advantage.3 On the other hand, informal 
retail channels such as fresh/wet markets have proved remarkably resilient in cultural contexts 
where ‘freshness’ is prized, along with the accessibility, low cost and personalized shopping 
experience that such markets provide for low income consumers (Humphrey, 2007). The third 
important domain of resistance concerns consumer preferences; rather than shop with retail 
TNCs, consumers may show loyalty to local stores/brands, or may prefer to continue shopping 
in traditional markets and small stores. More generally, it is well evidenced that consumer 
preferences and practices vary considerably across, and indeed within, different national 
contexts. This can be seen both in the varying levels of success of different formal retail formats 
– e.g. convenience stores, supermarkets and hypermarkets – across markets, and the similarly 
variable uptake of retail private label or own brand products (Shannon, 2014).  
 
The fourth dimension encompasses the resistance of local supply systems to changes 
initiated by retail TNCs. The seminal body of work on this topic by Reardon and co-authors (e.g. 
Reardon et al., 2007) has revealed the core processes at work, namely: the establishment of 
distribution centres and centralized procurement, the use of advanced logistics techniques, the 
shortening of supply networks and use of new forms of intermediaries, and the enforcement of 
                                                          
2 Such measures have encompassed equity thresholds, capital requirements, environmental and 
community/business impact study requirements, zoning restrictions, building and outlet-size codes, and store 
opening restrictions. 
3 In some instances, these competitive strengths were established before the entry of retail TNCs (e.g. see 
Bianchi and Ostale, 2006, on Chile). 
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private quality and safety standards. In reality, these changes play out highly unevenly across 
different product groups and, moreover, pre-existing supply structures may be more durable 
than expected, even when supplying to the modern retail sector (Endo, 2013). In terms of the 
case analysed in this paper, however, supply system resistance is not an overly important factor, 
partly due to the strength of the South Korean supply base before the entry of retail TNCs, 
which has offset the subsequent bargaining power of large retailers (Coe and Lee, 2006). 
 
Understanding Tesco’s exit from South Korea does, however, require us to add a fifth 
domain of resistance, namely that of labour. With certain exceptions, labour issues have largely 
been notable by their absence from the literature on retail globalization. The few existing studies 
(e.g. Gamble, 2006; Hurt and Hurt, 2005; Tilly and Galván, 2006) do not constitute a coherent 
approach and the agency of labour and its impact on retail TNCs has rarely been a research 
focus. The existing study of most direct relevance in that context is Jackson et al.’s (2004) work 
on the 2001 departure of Marks and Spencer from France, in which they detail how the exit 
process was heavily affected by labour resistance and the nature of French employment 
legislation. We can also take inspiration from Durand and Wrigley’s (2009) analysis that shows, 
for the cases of Wal-Mart and Carrefour, how successful management of host economy labour 
relations (in terms of collective organization, employment duration, regulation enforcement and 
wage bargaining) is an important component of market performance. In what follows, we shall 
see that the eventual unionization of Homeplus in 2013 ushered in a period of labour instability 
that was an integral element in the intersecting host market factors that underpinned the exit 
decision. 
 
There are, then, at least five potential sets of host markets factors – or domains of 
resistance – that may contribute to divestment decisions by retail TNCs. Importantly, these 
factors are market specific and dynamic – e.g. competition from domestic retailers or suppliers 
may build up over time. Moreover, the five factors may not all be due to increasing resistance to 
retail TNCs over time; conditions may be ameliorating in some areas, and getting tougher in 
others, depending on the specific national context.  
 
Our third distinctive argument is that we need to bring together both these aspects – 
home country conditions and the changing landscape of host market resistance – into a dynamic, 
relational theory of market divestment. Importantly, however, divestment decisions are more 
nuanced than simply being determined by a singular home-host market dyadic relationship. We 
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need to develop co-evolutionary accounts of market exit that recognise how both home and 
multiple host market elements develop over time and in relation to one another. The market 
conditions in a specific host economy are rarely judged in isolation, but rather on a comparative 
basis against other potentially saleable assets at a given point in time. The case study of 
divestment in this paper cannot be explained solely through developments in the UK home 
market, or in the South Korean host market, or through a combination of the two. Such 
accounts would miss the other subsidiaries whose performance and potentially saleability was 
actively considered as part of the decision-making processes. Divestment decisions are therefore 
the result of an avowedly relational process in which corporate managers intersect information on 
market performance across the home and a range of host market contexts. In turn, each of those 
contexts is not static but rather evolving dynamically in relation to local competitive and 
institutional conditions (i.e. the extent to which the different domains of resistance are ‘in play’) 
and it is the intersection of those trajectories that is integral to the corporate decision to divest 
(or not).  
 
As we shall in what follows, in the case of Tesco’s exit from South Korea, the initial 
impetus derived from Tesco’s stuttering home market performance, which required further 
capital investment and management attention, and a troublesome company balance sheet that 
demanded debt levels to be quickly and significantly reduced. This, then, was in essence a 
‘corporate crisis’ type divestment (Cairns et al., 2008; 2010), in contrast to the more considered 
earlier exit from Japan (2012) and subsidiary restructuring (2013) in China which were much 
more heavily influenced by host market under-performance. Once a portfolio review was 
initiated, however, the decision to divest Homeplus specifically reflected the simultaneous 
pressures of few viable acquisition candidates amongst Tesco’s subsidiary businesses, and a 
progressively more challenging South Korean host market context.  
 
Tesco on the retreat in the UK – the anatomy of the ‘push’ towards divestment  
In its February 2015 results, Tesco announced the biggest annual loss ever made by a UK 
retailer – £6.4bn. The deficit reflected £7bn worth of one-off costs, key elements of which were 
a £4.7bn loss from revaluation of its properties in the context of lower trading volumes and 
profits, and £416m in redundancy costs for over 10,000 employees. Sales were down 3 percent 
on the preceding year, and group trading profits were down 58 percent at £1.4bn. 43 store 
closures were announced. The results capped a terrible period for Tesco, the nadir of which was 
the discovery, in October 2014, of a £263m overstatement of profits to the City of London in 
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August 2014. The overstatement related to how Tesco recognised income from vendors, and led 
to subsequent legal charges being levelled at three senior managers, who appeared at 
Westminster Magistrate’s Court in September 2016 to face one count of fraud and one count of 
false accounting over the period February to September 2014 (they pleaded not guilty). The 
scandal caused Tesco to rapidly lose £2bn in market value, with share values falling below 200p 
from a relatively stable 400p over the period 2010-2013.  
 
Two broader trends presaged this crisis point for Tesco. First, its dominant position as 
the UK’s leading grocery retailer was already starting to wane in a challenging post-crisis 
economic context and in the face of aggressive competition from the German discount retailers 
Aldi and Lidl. These negative conditions within the retailer’s domestic market were regarded as 
having been exacerbated by related structural pressures, characterised by a drift by customers 
away from large, hypermarket ‘big box’ stores (which made up 45 percent of Tesco’s UK selling 
space) towards more frequent visits to smaller, local stores alongside increased online shopping 
(Wood and McCarthy, 2013). From the late 1990s to that time, Tesco’s expansion had seemed 
unstoppable with turnover rising from £16.5bn in 1998 to £67.5bn by 2011, while profits grew 
from £760m to £3.5bn over the same period. Its UK grocery market share in the period 2006-
2014 was consistently in the 30-32 percent range, well ahead of any competitor. In January 2012, 
however, Tesco issued its first ever profit warning, and the period from 2011-2014 saw turnover 
and profits level off before the calamitous results of 2015. By 2016, its UK grocery market share 
had fallen to 28.5 percent. There were many analyses of what underpinned this slowdown – in 
turn exacerbated by the reputational damage of the profit overstatement – with most pointing to 
a lack of focus on the core UK operation, manifested in under-investment and lack of 
engagement with customer needs in a time of austerity.  
 
Second, while Tesco was the undoubtedly a darling of the UK stock market in the 2000s, 
and its international expansion plan was widely lauded for its cautious approach and ‘capital 
discipline’, in the early 2010s this relationship had started to sour, necessitating a ‘re-setting’ of 
the firm’s relationship with the UK financial market (Wood et al., 2017). This process of re-
evaluating Tesco’s international operations was initiated by Dave Lewis’ predecessor Philip 
Clarke in 2013 and 2014 in response to 2012/2013 results which saw trading profits decline by 
10.3 percent in its Asian operations and 37.8 percent in Europe. These losses were followed in 
April 2013 by Tesco admitting defeat in its bid to penetrate the highly competitive North 
American market. Tesco had entered the western US market in 2007 via an especially designed 
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‘Fresh and Easy’ supermarket format (for more, see Lowe and Wrigley, 2010). The business was 
beset with problems from the outset, however, and the decision to pull out and sell off its assets 
incurred a loss of £2bn and a further £150m in exit costs. In addition to withdrawing from the 
US, another strategic move was the 2013 restructuring of Tesco’s wholly owned loss-making 
China operation via a joint venture with leading local retailer CRE, which significantly reduced 
its exposure in that market (Tesco retained just 20 percent ownership). Recent years, then, have 
seen Tesco returning to the more frugal mode of international investment that characterised its 
expansion in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Interestingly, however, in 2013 South Korea was still 
viewed as a market of ‘highest international priority’ for Tesco in which it should continue to 
invest (Wood et al., 2017), suggesting that it was the events of 2014 that really cast Homeplus in 
new light from a UK management perspective. 
 
Uncovering the process of divestment 
Our interviews with the analyst community offered insights into the seemingly 
questionable decision to sell such a prized international subsidiary as Homeplus. After all, as 
Table 2 demonstrates, Tesco had a vast portfolio of international operations that it could 
potentially have divested in preference to its South Korean operations, including an extensive 
presence in Eastern Europe, successful businesses in Thailand and Malaysia, as well as the 
renowned retail marketing insights agency, DunnHumby. While not public knowledge, our 
discussions with analysts revealed the extent to which Tesco was active in exploring alternative 
divestment options to raise capital. As one respondent commented, there were efforts to market 
some of Tesco’s subsidiary businesses to interested parties: 
 
You wouldn’t see it – it would happen behind closed-doors, but they would mandate an investment bank, 
who will run a formal process [which] would flush out any interest and any potential, price-tags that 
potential buyers would be willing to pay (C1) 
 
In particular, Tesco’s Eastern European business was understood to be ‘in play’ and open to bids 
from interested parties. This sizeable operation − across four countries and accounting for 
£6.9bn in sales in 2015/6 − had experienced poor performance in recent years emanating from 
structural pressures also present in the UK market as well as from regulatory interventions from 
European governments, specifically targeted at large format international retailers (e.g. Polish sales 
taxes [see Financial Times, 2016] and additional rules in Hungary [see Reuters, 2014]). Perhaps 
unsurprisingly Tesco failed to find a buyer largely because ‘the industry dynamics are very challenged 
there’ (C1). 
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Another early candidate for divestment was the wholly owned marketing insights firm, 
DunnHumby, that had assisted Tesco in the development of its Clubcard loyalty tool. Initial 
press reports suggested the retailer could raise in the region of £2bn from its sale but it soon 
became clear that such valuations were unrealistic in the current investment climate and any 
potential transaction soon unravelled: 
 
They decided to keep hold of Dunnhumby rather than sell it for less than they think it’s worth because 
they kind of went “it’s not a fire-sale, we’re not desperate for the money” (F1) 
 
A more conventional divestment could have been either (or both) of the Thai or Malaysian 
businesses. These operations were well respected and profitable, with a prevailing view that they 
could have been successfully sold. Our respondents argued there were three reasons for retaining 
them. First, there was significant growth potential, especially in the Thai market, with fewer 
demands on the balance sheet: 
 
The Thai business is a longer-term growth asset. They believe they’ve got a very strong market position 
there, and it’s not that capital-intensive a business (D1) 
 
Second, the ownership structure of the Thai business was complicated with much of its property 
owned by a third party real estate investment trust, of which Tesco retains a significant 
proportion (Tesco Lotus Retail Growth Freehold and Leasehold Property Fund) meaning any 
divestment would have been complex. Finally, the geography of Thailand and Malaysia led to a 
complementary and synergistic relationship between the two subsidiaries that further reinforced 
the argument for retaining them together: 
 
I think the reason why they went for Korea and not Thailand is Korea was more discrete, more self-
standing (F1) 
 
The temporal aspects of the divestment negotiations and decision-making process are also 
important to understand alongside any issues of geographical and strategic fit. The quasi-public 
nature of Tesco’s financial predicament and its likely divestment of one or more of its key assets 
led to significant uncertainty within the investment community but equally within the separate 
international subsidiaries themselves. Such conditions, though understandable, required a swift 
resolution. Failure to do so would have been potentially destabilising, as one respondent 
reflected: 
 
Everybody within these assets is updating their resume and trying to find a better job, just feeling really 
demoralised, so actually, any retail performance you have quickly gets worse because people have other 
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priorities – protecting their own lives. On top of that, the people that leave first are the best ones. So, [you] 
can’t be in a state of that limbo-land [for long] (A1) 
 
This ensured that any sale process was concluded within tight timelines and a resolution reached. 
 
The role of strategic leadership was equally critical to the divestment decision. Many 
observers felt that the change in CEO was critical; the internal successor to Terry Leahy, Philip 
Clarke, had been involved in building up Tesco’s international operations, including in South 
Korea, so arguably carried substantial emotional attachment to the Asian businesses. In contrast, 
Dave Lewis, as an external appointment from Unilever, carried no such baggage and was able to 
offer a fresh and radical perspective on Tesco’s overall portfolio given ‘there was no emotional 
connection between him and the previous regime, and his sense of “family silver” is probably a lot weaker than 
anyone else’s’ (E1) 
 
Against this backdrop, the rationale behind the decision to sell Tesco Homeplus in late 
2015 starts to become clearer. At that point Tesco shares were trading at a level not seen since 
the 1990s, namely 140p. Selling the jewel in the crown – an attractive going concern to 
international investors – generated significant cash at relatively short notice that could 
immediately be put against corporate debt on the balance sheet. A widely held contention was 
that the sheer size of the Homeplus business underpinned the transaction: 
The only thing that it had that it could sell that would be big enough to fix its balance sheet, or at least 
shore it up to the extent that people would be happy, was Korea (B1) 
As Tesco’s (2015) divestment statement suggested, it would allow a ‘significant reduction of 
£4,225 million in Tesco group’s total indebtedness from net cash proceeds and associated 
reduction in capitalised lease and other commitments’. The capital raised from the sale allowed 
Tesco to present a more positive financial outlook; in February 2017, with the financial year 
returning an overall profit of £1.28bn and group debt being reduced from £8.5bn two years 
earlier to £3.7bn (excluding Tesco Bank). At this time, the retailer’s shares had slowly recovered 
to around 200p, still well below the levels of the late 2000s and early 2010s. Home country 
financial considerations, then, were evidently a clear driver behind the rationale to sell 
Homeplus.4 However, our analysis has found that an array of host market factors were also 
instrumental in cementing the divestment – something that requires consideration of the 
                                                          
4 Tesco has not been alone among leading global retailers in facing these challenges. For more analysis of this 
home financial market influenced phase of retail divestment, see Burt et al. (2017). 
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changing conditions within the South Korean retail market, and the increasingly challenging 
environment being faced by Homeplus. It is to these we now turn. 
 
Four domains of growing host market resistance in South Korea 
Growing host market resistance in four domains also drove Tesco’s exit from South 
Korea. The resistance from small and medium-sized local retailers, the loss of consumer trust, 
the conflict with the labour union, and the state’s re-regulation all strongly influenced Tesco’s 
decision to withdraw5. We now consider each of these in turn. 
 
i. Intensifying competition, and increased activism, from local retailers 
Due to the state’s policy to relax regulation of the retail market after the Asian financial 
crisis, global retailers such as Walmart, Carrefour, and Tesco were able to enter the South 
Korean market (see Table 3) and grew explosively alongside the Korean large chain retailers 
(Coe and Lee, 2006; 2013). Their competition has intensified in the Korean market over time, 
while, in contrast, small and medium sized local merchants and traditional markets have seen a 
fast declining market share (Kim and Yoon, 2011; see Table 4). 
Large chain retailers turned to super-supermarkets (SSMs) – which are larger than convenience 
stores and smaller than hypermarkets (usually in the range 1600-2600m2) – as revenue growth 
and store openings in the discount store (hypermarket) segment started to slow after the mid-
2000s (Joongang Daily, 2010). As a result, all the leading retailers have established an SSM brand 
– Lotte with Lotte Supermarket, Tesco with Homeplus Express, GS Retail with GS 
Supermarkets, and E-Mart with E-Mart Everyday. Most of them have aggressively pursued rapid 
expansion in SSMs over the past decade. Among them, the ‘big three’ SSMs were Lotte 
Supermarkets, Homeplus Express, and GS Supermarkets, while E-Mart did not expand its SSMs 
as rapidly (see Table 4). As of 2010, the number of E-mart Everyday was 23, while the number 
of Lotte Supermarkets, Homeplus Express and GS Supermarkets were 287, 244, and 209 
respectively (Coe and Lee, 2013). While the number of SSMs tripled from 234 in 2003 to 677 in 
2009, the number of small independent supermarkets – also known as mom-and-pop stores – 
radically decreased from 104,417 to 79,200 over the same period. The number of the SSMs 
topped 1,475 throughout the nation by 2015, pushing many more mom-and-pop businesses to 
                                                          
5 While we present these developments in this paper as barriers to expansion from the Tesco perspective, we in 
no way mean to suggest in a more normative sense that these are regressive developments. From a South Korean 
perspective, the protection of local retailers and increasing unionisation levels, for instance, can be read in 
progressive terms. 
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the brink of bankruptcy (Table 4). Overall, small business owners and traditional markets have 
lost market share while large discount stores and SSMs gained (Kim and Hallsworth, 2016). 
With severe local competition among large retailers, strong resistance to the expansion of 
SSMs mounted (Kim and Yoon, 2011). As the SSMs operated by large retailers encroached upon 
locally-owned neighbourhood markets, small merchants organized themselves politically by 
coupling with civic organizations and the opposition party in 2005. They formed an emergency 
planning committee, which consisted of the Korea Federation of Supermarkets Cooperative, the 
Korea Chain Business Cooperative, and the National Small Business Guide Association in May 
2005 (Hangure, 2005). More than 40 Small Merchant groups – such as the Korea Merchant 
Association, the Association of Korea Clothes Sales, the Korean Optometric Association, and 
the Korean Stationery Wholesale Cooperative – also launched the Emergency Planning 
Committee for Deterring the Rapid Growth of Discount Stores and SSMs in January 2007 
(Hangure, 2007). They sought to call the government’s attention to the regulation of oligopolistic 
behavior (Korean Chain Store Association, 2008) and, from our respondents’ perspective, the 
regulatory responses that followed were inherently political: every once in a while, a party thinks we’ll 
restrict big companies, and we’ll garner the favour of this part of the electorate in the process (C1). We shall 
return to the regulatory outcomes of this organised resistance shortly. 
 
ii. Waning consumer loyalty 
Recent consumer criticism of Homeplus’ perceived misbehaviour has also contributed to 
Tesco’s departure. Homeplus was accused of collecting and selling customer information 
including names, phone numbers, birthdays and details of family members and of having bad 
relations with suppliers. As this public criticism was growing severely against Homeplus during 
2014, the National Assembly’s Trade, Industry and Energy Committee called for Homeplus to 
attend its audit. In the October 2014 audit, Homeplus had to explain why Homeplus 
intentionally sold off its customers’ private information to third parties and why it earned a low 
grade in terms of value sharing with its suppliers (Korea Herald, 2014). Through this audit, 
lawmakers of the main opposition New Politics Alliance for Democracy (NPAD) party disclosed 
that Homeplus had sold private data of over 5 million customers who had signed up for free 
giveaway events on Homeplus’ grocery store and corporate websites, to third parties. The 
NPAD revealed that Homeplus earned more than 10 billion won (£7.4 million) by attracting 
consumers to participate in its events to win pricey gifts such as BMW and Mercedes-Benz 
luxury cars between October 2010 and July 2014 (Korea Herald, 2014). After the audit, ten 
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consumer organizations within the Korea National Council of Consumer Organization 
organized a boycott of Homeplus in February 2015. The National Federation of a Nationwide 
Housewife Classroom, the Korean Women’s Union Consumers, the Young Women’s Christian 
Association (YWCA) of Korea, the Consumers Union of Korea, the Federation of Korean 
YMCA, the Korea Institute of Consumer Education, the Consumer Civic Group, the Korea 
Institute of Consumer Life, the Green Consumer Network in Korea, and the Grand Lodge of 
the Korean Wife participated in the boycott (Asia Economy, 2015).  
 
In response to this public backlash and criticism, Homeplus CEO Do Sung-hwan 
publicly apologized over a series of malpractices the company was involved in from the alleged 
sale of customer information to unfair treatment of suppliers. During his first press conference 
held since his inauguration in 2013, he stated, “We’re reflecting on ourselves over what has happened in the 
past year. We’ll strive to win back customers’ trust and meet their expectations […] 2015 will serve as an 
opportunity for us to transform into a customer-only retailer” (Korea Herald, 2015).  
 
At the same time as persistent rumours about Tesco’s attempt to offload Homeplus were 
being fuelled by the CEO's statement, 13 local consumer groups including the Consumer Justice 
Center within the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ), the People’s Solidarity for 
Participatory Democracy, and the Green Consumer Network in Korea severely criticized 
Homeplus for malpractices. Through these consumer groups, 2,200 customers of Homeplus 
filed a class action suit against Tesco for damages, claiming that it illegally sold information it 
collected through giveaway events and membership registrations (Women News, 2015). These 
actions against Homeplus and the associated loss of trust prompted consumers to switch to 
online shopping as part of a wider trend of strong online penetration (see Table 5), and was 
another contributory factor in Tesco’s decision to withdraw from the South Korean market.  
 
iii. Collective labour pushes back 
While Homeplus was renowned for a highly territorially embedded business model which 
enabled the company to be highly responsive to local consumers’ tastes, in terms of labour 
relations it for a long time pursued an avowedly no union rule. The former CEO Lee Seng-Han’s 
Shinbaram strategy to secure local employee loyalty was quite successful (Coe and Lee, 2006), 
but he did not want labour recognition. Only one labour union existed, resulting from the 
incorporation of E-Land's Homever discount stores in 2008, and its influence was partial, with 
only 33 Homeplus discount stores out of 133 belonging to the union as of early 2013. Hence, 
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there was no labour union covering all the stores of Homeplus until 27 March 2013, when a 
company-wide labour union was finally organized in Homeplus.6 
Up until then, due to the absence of a labour union, workers in Homeplus were 
predominantly on non-standard contracts, providing both flexibility in staffing levels and 
efficiencies that could translate into net margins from the company perspective. In so doing, 
Homeplus was not out of line with developments in the economy more generally, but its sheer 
size and foreign ownership made its labour relations a sensitive topic. According to Homeplus’ 
labour deputy chief, 15,000 Homeplus workers out of the total of approximately 20,000 are non-
standard workers,7 who are those with temporary, short-term or part-time contracts and dispatch 
(agency) workers (Joongang Daily, 2014). These non-standard jobs pay low wages, provide few 
social insurance benefits and do not have implicit guarantees of long-term employment. Above 
all, the poor working conditions were the focus of controversy. Homeplus’ notorious 
employment system was a ‘0.5 hour contract system’, whose basic unit was not 1 hour but 0.5 
hour or 0.2 hour.8 Most non-standard workers were contracted to work 7.5 hours per day, 
including some unpaid ‘getting ready’ and ‘finishing time’ and had just a 30 minute lunch break 
(compared to one hour for workers on the regular eight hour day). They also worked substantial 
overtime for which they did not receive pay because it only brought them up to the statutory 40-
hour South Korean working week. According to a union official, ‘this unfair contract system was 
actually introduced by the former CEO Lee from the beginning, although the company officially says that it was 
introduced from 2004 […] Based on this 0.5 hour contract system, the company annually saved huge labour costs 
of about 11.3 billion won’ (News Way, 2013). After organizing the labour union in 2013, the union 
persistently raised the critical question of the unfair employment system and called a general 
strike, demanding the shift from 7.5 hours work per day to 8 hours work per day. Homeplus’ 0.5 
hour contract system was dramatically abolished at the end of severe conflicts between the 
management and the union in January 2014, and the negotiations of employment contracts and 
living wages between labour and management were finally concluded in October 2014 (Choi, 
2015).  
iv. The challenges of re-regulation 
                                                          
6 Interview with a scholar, who wrote a paper on Tesco’s conflicts with small local merchants and the labour 
union, 10 October 2016.  
7 After the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the non-standard employment became popular as a result of neoliberal 
labour reforms in South Korea. According to the Korean Contingent Workers' Center, there were more than 8.5 
million non-standard workers in 2009, accounting for approximately 52 per cent of all wage-earners. While non-
standard workers earned 53.5 per cent of the average monthly wage of regular workers in August 2000, they 
earned just 46.8 per cent in March 2010 (Korean Contingent Workers' Center, 2010; Lee, 2011).  
8 Interview with a research fellow in the Korea Labour Institute on 16th December 2016. 
19 
 
The state’s reaction to small and medium scale retailers’ demands on regulation was not 
prompt; it delayed decision-making on the regulation of large discount stores and SSMs due to 
the strong opposition to the regulation from Trade Minister Kim Jong-hoon, and the 
ambassadors of the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) (Kim and Yoon, 
2011).9 Trade Minister Kim and the foreign actors strongly alleged that if the state’s plan to 
regulate SSMs run by transnational retail firms and chaebols as part of efforts to protect small 
merchants was implemented, it would undermine fair competition and could trigger a trade 
dispute with the EU. They urged the state to drop the plan. Trade Minister Kim Jong-hoon 
argued that the bills, if approved, could violate the country’s free trade agreement with the EU, 
which was at that time awaiting parliamentary approval (The Korea Times, 2010b). These 
pressures influenced the state’s delay in making its decision on the regulation of SSMs.  
In response to these delays, the small merchants scaled up their networks by banding 
together with more progressive political groups such as the MINBYUN-Lawyers for a 
Democratic Society, the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, the Citizens’ Coalition 
for Economic Justice, and the Korea Alliance for Progressive Movement. They launched a Pan-
National Network for Saving Small Merchants in May 2009. Through this network, they began a 
countrywide signature-seeking campaign for small merchants, demanding from the government 
and the National Assembly (1) regulations on large discount stores and SSMs; (2) the reduction 
of credit card store commissions; and (3) a safety net for bankrupt small merchants. Through the 
solidarity with other civil groups and the national campaign, the small merchants successfully 
aroused public opinion on re-regulation and thus strengthened their political influence based on 
this wider support.  
In turn, the state’s Small and Medium Business Administration (SMBA) delegated its 
authority on the business mediation system between large and small and medium enterprises to 
municipal governments in August 2009. After this delegation, a growing number of small 
merchants filed petitions in order to prevent the major large discount stores from entering into 
their traditional market areas (Daily Economy, 2009). According to the Korea Federation of 
Small and Medium Business, in the first two days after the delegation, a total of 13 petitions were 
filed in an attempt to hamper retail giants' entry into the small merchant neighbour niche 
markets; six cases against Homeplus Express, three against E-Mart Everyday, one each for GS 
                                                          
9 At the time, the South Korea state was scheduled to sign the Korea-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The 
state officially began to negotiate with the EU on the Korea-EU FTA in May 2007 and reached an agreement on 
its negotiations with the EU in October 2009. Korea and the EU duly signed the agreement in June 2010 (Kim 
and Yoon, 2011). 
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Super and Lotte Super, and two for Busan-based Top-Mart (Daily Economy, 2009). Some of 
local governments accepted the small merchants’ requests for temporary suspension or business 
reconsideration of SSMs and regulated opening days/hours and sale items to protect small 
merchants in locally owned neighbourhood markets (Korea Herald, 2009).  
Homeplus actively sought to challenge these SSM regulations, while the other discount 
stores such as E-mart and Lotte-Mart, at least publicly, accepted them (Kim and Hallsworth, 
2016). Homeplus persistently opposed government policies and continued to expand its stores 
by changing the ownership structure towards franchising, which was not subject to these 
regulations, while E-Mart Everyday and Lotte Supermarket generally reflected public opinion 
and adhered to government policies (Korea Times, 2010a). Homeplus’ expansion of its Express 
format was notably strong from 2011 onwards (Table 1). By publicly expressing its discontent 
with government policies, Homeplus Express made itself the obvious target for protest. For 
example, local civic groups and small and mid-sized business owners rallied to oppose the 
opening of Homeplus Express stores in Jinju, Cheongju, and Wae-dong, Gimhae City in 2009 
(Kim and Hallsworth, 2016).  
Tesco’s head office in the UK directly conveyed its concerns on the enactment of the 
Korean SSM restriction law to the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Tesco also 
placed diplomatic pressure on the Korean government through the UK government and the EU. 
For example, the British Ambassador to Seoul, Martin Uden, addressed the issue on the SSM 
regulations during his meeting with Chung Mong-joon, chairman of the governing Grand 
National Party on 13th January 2010. Uden expressed his hope that a speedy resolution could be 
found, saying that some 50 new Homeplus stores in South Korea were unable to open. The EU 
also conveyed its concern about the regulations, alleging that if implemented, the regulation 
would damage fair competition and could cause a trade dispute (Korea Times, 2010a). Tesco’s 
resistance and diplomatic pressure inspired further resistance from small to mid-sized business 
owners, tarnished its corporate image, and made some customers turn their back on Homeplus 
(Choi and Hong, 2011).10 According to Kim and Hallsworth’s (2016) survey of 1,092 consumers 
in 22 cities, South Korean consumers supported the re-regulatory moves. 
The Distribution Industry Development Act was eventually passed in the National 
Assembly on 10 November 2010, and the Act on the Promotion of Collaborative Cooperation 
                                                          
10 Regional wide boycott campaigns against Homeplus and signature seeking campaigns on regulation of the 
openings of Homeplus express were spread widely (Choi and Hong, 2011). 
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between Large Enterprises and Small-Medium Enterprises was passed on 25 November 2010.11 
After several months of dispute12, revisions to the Distribution Industry Development Act were 
passed in the National Assembly on 23 June 2011 and came into effect on 30 June 2011 (Asia 
Today, 2011; Ebnews, 2011). The changes stipulated that local government officials could 
delimit ‘traditional commerce conservations districts’ at a 1km radius around traditional markets 
or shopping districts, and both hypermarket and SSMs opening could be prohibited or have 
conditions imposed within that zone (Kim and Hallsworth, 2013). In December 2011, the law 
was adjusted to prohibit discount stores from trading between 12am and 9am (or between 11pm 
and 8am) in a bid to protect local retailers. The 2012 Sunday Trading Law, in turn, applied 
Sunday trading restrictions to conglomerate-owned retail stores, mandating that stores should 
close on the second and fourth Sundays of every month. It is estimated that the Sunday trading 
regulation alone hit Homeplus’ profits by 2, 4 and 5 percent in the financial years 2012, 2013 and 
2014 respectively (Morgan Stanley, 2015). While these may seem like small declines, it is 
important to remember that retailing is essentially a high volume/small net margin business and 
so such drops represent significant sums and may alter how a market is perceived, from a 
distance, by managers.13 As one respondent commented, such (re)regulation undoubtedly helped 
pave the path to divestment: 
[The regulations] weren’t limited by any means exclusively to Tesco […] Foreign retailers were kind of 
victimised, in a way […] Those types of obstacles being put in your way makes you a bit less heartbroken 
if you decide to sell what was a very successful business (E1) 
 
Moreover, at the time of divestment, we also understand that many of the Homeplus stores had 
their leases up for renewal meaning that it represented a critical decision point for appraising the 
future of the firm. Overall, these distribution industry regulatory policies – when coupled with a 
structural shift away from larger stores evident elsewhere − undoubtedly helped to expedite 
Tesco’s departure from South Korea, as neatly summarised by one of our respondents:  
[Homeplus] was not a double-digit growth business for the next 10 years […] slow and steady as you go is 
the best you’re going to get [… and] at worst a negative headwind in terms of sales and profitability and 
regulation, and so, […] I think they actually did quite well, and the new owners have had a few, […] not 
entirely happy experiences since they took over (F1) 
 
  
                                                          
11 Interview with a professor who wrote an article on the regulation of the SSM, 9 December 2016. 
12 Through the disputes and revisions, the regulation was weakened due to the Korean conglomerates’ lobbying 
(Kim and Yoon, 2011).  
13 We thank Steve Burt for this important observation. 
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Conclusions 
At first glance, Tesco’s decision to sell its multi-billion pound South Korean subsidiary in 
late 2015 might appear a strange decision. Built up over a fifteen year period and with a 
significant market share and impressive track record, Homeplus was − by nearly every measure 
− Tesco’s best performing subsidiary. Since 2010, however, conditions had changed in important 
ways for Tesco in the UK, wider international and specifically the South Korean markets. The 
central argument of this paper has been that the interplay of these sets of factors underpinned 
the divestment decision. In the post-recessionary home market context, Tesco was losing market 
share and was under increased pressure from competitors, notably the German discounters Aldi 
and Lidl, even before it became embroiled in an accounting scandal in 2014. This led to 
unsustainable debt levels on its balance sheet that required attention. In South Korea, concerted 
lobbying efforts from small local retailers and other stakeholders over a period of years led to 
significant re-regulatory interventions in 2011-12, and Homeplus subsequently faced additional 
challenges in its relations with organised labour and consumers. And while alternative 
international subsidiaries might have been preferred candidates for divestment by the retailer, it 
is clear that efforts to raise capital through their disposal were thwarted due to a shortage of 
potential acquirers.  
 
Beyond the specifics, we have sought to use the Homeplus case to make three interlinked 
contributions to the literature on retail divestment. First, and most straightforwardly, our study is 
a reminder of the extent to which market exit decisions can be influenced by home country 
factors, and in particular underlying financial considerations and the need to appease the 
financial markets. Second, we have provided a framework for profiling the different host markets 
‘domains of resistance’ that may come into play. Re-regulatory responses and competition from 
domestic retailers have received some attention hitherto in the literature, and in some contexts 
supplier pressure may be important; in the Homeplus case resistance from consumers and 
workers were also shown to be contributory factors. These five domains of resistance –
government re-regulation, domestic retailer competition, supplier pressure, consumer 
movements and worker collective actions – may or may not be relevant in particular contexts, 
and may be moving in different directions in terms of resistance to TNC activity. In South 
Korea, the four domains we profiled all developed post-2010 in ways that made things 
increasingly difficult for Homeplus. Third, and most importantly, we conceptualised the exit 
decision as being framed by the dynamic interplay of these home and host market factors. We 
need to construct co-evolutionary accounts of market exit that recognise how both home and 
23 
 
multiple host market elements develop over time and in relation to one another (see Figure 1). 
In the Homeplus case, it was critical that both the UK situation and that in South Korea were 
worsening simultaneously, from a Tesco perspective, in the period since 2010. If Tesco’s home 
market situation had remained strong, it is unthinkable that its broadly healthy Homeplus 
subsidiary would have been offered for sale. Equally, if alternative assets such as its Eastern 
European retail operation or its retail marketing insights firm, DunnHumby had attracted the 
attention of acquirers it is likely they would have been divested in preference to Homeplus. 
Finally, if growth had not stagnated in South Korea and resistance started to build across a range 
of domains, Tesco may have fought to hold onto the ‘jewel in its crown’ even when facing home 
market difficulties.  
 
In terms of its globalization dynamics, and despite a notable upturn in aggregate activity 
since the late 1990s, retailing has proven to be a particularly fickle sector, with a complex mosaic 
of success and failures as transnational retailers have sought to gain a foothold in a wide range of 
emerging markets. Some previous accounts have undoubtedly underestimated the degree of 
resistance from the domains detailed in this paper, but also the extent to which they may 
strengthen over time as opposed to diminishing in the face of the power and resources of the 
retail TNCs. At the same time, the arguments in this paper also have wider resonance. In general 
terms, the economic geography literature on TNCs and global production networks tends to 
focus primarily – and understandably perhaps – on expansion and market entry, with much less 
research on markets exits and divestments, which may be equally if not more revealing 
analytically about globalization processes and the challenges and resistances that are inherent to 
them. There are thus important connections to be made to recent work that has focused on 
‘ruptures’ and ‘disarticulations’ in global economic formations (Coe and Hess, 2011; Bair and 
Werner, 2011). 
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Table 1: Tesco’s expansion in South Korea, 1999-2014. 
 
No. of 
employees 
Sales (including 
tenants, billion 
Won) 
No. of Stores 
Homeplus Express 
1999 500 272 2 
 
2000 1500 619 7 
 
2001 3000 1399 14 
 
2002 5000 2381 21 
 
2003 8300 3252 28 
 
2004 8800 3879 31 7 
2005 11500 4789 42 21 
2006 12200 5327 52 39 
2007 12900 6016 66 71 
2008 21500 7480 110 131 
2009 22933 9800 114 165 
2010 25051 10800 121 213 
2011 27814 10365 124 257 
2012 26748 10301 134 297 
2013 25496 9894 139 388 
2014 25972 9470 139 536 
Source: Annual reports 
Note: ‘Homeplus’ refers to large-format hypermarkets, while ‘Express’ refers to small 
supermarkets/convenience stores. 
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Table 2: Tesco plc international operations, sales and estimated margin, 2013 
 
Country  
(Year of Entry) 
Sales 
£m 
 
Market 
Share 
% 
Sales 
Growth 
Y-o-Y 
% 
L-f-L Sales 
Growth³ 
Y-o-Y % 
EBIT 
margin¹ 
% 
Store 
Numbers 
 
Total 
Space 
‘000 sq 
ft 
 
UK 43,579 30.1 3.2 (0.3) 5.2² 3,146 40,495 
        
Europe 9,312  (5.6) (2.3) 3.5² 1,507 34,077 
Hungary 
(1994) 
1,606 14.9 (9.5) (0.7) 1.2 216 7,329 
Poland 
(1995) 
2,176 7.0 (4.9) (3.0) 5.1 446 9,426 
Slovak Rep. 
(1996) 
1,114 22.8 (1.2) 0.6 4.2 136 3,822 
Czech Rep. 
(1996) 
1,356 10.9 (11.8) (7.0) 3.0 376 6,092 
Rep of Ireland 
(1997 – re-
entry) 
2,315 20.0 (5.3) (0.3) 5.9 142 3,455 
Turkey 
(2003 – 
divested 2016) 
745 1.3 7.5 (5.4) (3.4) 191 3,953 
        
Asia 11,422  6.0 (1.8) 5.4² 2,131 41,664 
Thailand 
(1998) 
3,742 13.0 15.7 3.1 7.9 1,433 14,320 
South Korea 
(1999) 
5,311 8.6 (0.5) (5.3) 6.9 520 13,230 
Malaysia 
(2001) 
937 4.8 5.2 0.5 4.9 47 3,918 
China 
(2004) 
1,432 0.2 9.2 (1.1) (5.6) 131 10,196 
Dunn Humby 191.5 n/a 15.9 n/a  n/a n/a 
 
Continuing operations only 
¹ EBIT Margin is the ratio of Earnings before Interest and Taxes to net revenue - earned. It is a measure of a 
company's profitability on sales over a specific time period. 
² Trading Profit Margin is listed to allow a clear comparison between the main Tesco businesses (i.e. UK, Europe, 
Asia) 
³ Like-for-Like sales provide a comparable measure from stores open the previous year to provide an underlying 
measure of performance that strips out the effects of new stores, extensions and closures. 
 
Sources: Tesco Analyst Packs; IGD, 2013; Shore Capital, 2013, Companies House Annual 
Accounts 
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Table 3: Numbers of discount stores in South Korea, 1999-2016.  
 
E-mart Lotte-mart Homeplus Carrefour Homever Costco 
1999 23 12 2 15 
 
3 
2000 35 18 7 21 
 
5 
2001 47 27 17 22 
 
5 
2002 57 29 26 27 
 
5 
2003 65 33 29 27 
 
5 
2004 75 39 36 27 
 
5 
2005 83 43 40 31 
 
5 
2006 86 45 43 32 
 
5 
2007 106 52 54 Withdrew 33 5 
2008 114 57 64 
 
35 5 
2009 122 73 111 
 
36 7 
2010 127 84 116 
  
7 
2011 134 92 123 
  
7 
2012 135 95 129 
  
7 
2013 146 104 136 
  
9 
2014 148 109 139 
  
11 
2015 146 114 140 
  
11 
2016 150 115 141 
  
12 
Source: Korea Chain Store Association, 2000-2016. 
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Table 4: The growth of Super-Supermarkets (SSMs). 
 
Number of 
SSMs* 
Number of ‘big 
three’ SSMs 
Number of 
independent ‘mom-
and-pop’ stores 
(below 150  ) 
Number of 
discount stores 
 
Number of 
convenience 
stores (chain 
owned) 
1999 208 59 
   
2000 196 56 
  
2,826 
2001 202 67 
  
3,780 
2002 231 97 
 
235 5,680 
2003 234 104 104,417 261 7,200 
2004 253 143 
 
278 8,247 
2005 267 147 99,500 306 9,085 
2006 292 166 
 
337 9,928 
2007 370 217 88,659 
363 
 
11,056 
2008 485 323 
 
394 
 
12,485 
2009 677 489 79,200 
409 
 
14,130 
2010 928 606 
 
437 
 
16,937 
2011 1050 694 n/a 
446 
 
21,221 
2012 1280 942 
 
470 
 
24,559 
2013 1300 1038 n/a 
483 
 
24,859 
2014 1369 1185 
 
508 
 
26,020 
2015 1475 1388 n/a 
  
Source: Korea Chain Store Association, 2000-2016. 
* The SSM data are based on those of the eight main SSMs: Lotte Supermarket, GS Retail, 
Homeplus Express, E-Mart Everyday, SM, Seo Won Distribution, CS Distribution and Suhyup 
Distribution. 
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Table 5: Retail sales by store type, 2000-2015 (trillion won). 
 
 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Discount stores 10.6 23.7 34.1 39.6 
TV/Internet shopping 3.2 15.3 29.2 45.6 
Department stores 15.0 17.0 24.8 29.1 
Convenience stores 1.4 4.6 7.8 18.0 
Super-Supermarkets* - 2.2 5.0 7.4 
 
Source: Korea Chain Store Association, 2000-2016. 
* The SSM data are based on those of the eight main SSMs: Lotte Supermarket, GS Retail, 
Homeplus Express, E-Mart Everyday, SM, Seo Won Distribution, CS Distribution and Suhyup 
Distribution. 
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Figure 1: Relational Drivers for Homeplus Divestment across Tesco plc 
 
South Korean Host Market Drivers and Facilitators 
Government re-regulation of retail FDI in South Korea – reduced growth prospects 
Changing consumer cultures away from ‘big box’ stores – reduced growth prospects 
Intensifying competition, and increased activism, from local retailers – reduced growth 
prospects 
Collective labour pushes back – reduced growth prospects 
Lease expiry across a number of retail properties – an opportune time to divest 
  UK (Home Market) Drivers and Facilitators 
Balance sheet shortfall requires immediate attention – need to sell assets 
Home market performance issues which requires stabilisation and reinvigoration: 
- Shift in capital expenditure from international operations to home market 
- Signal home market prioritisation to the capital markets 
- Shift in management time and attention to home market 
Change in leadership – new CEO had no emotional sunk cost with Asian businesses 
Other Tesco Subsidiary Drivers and Facilitators 
Eastern 
Europe 
No interest from acquirers for Eastern European retail operation amid 
stuttering performance – Eastern European divestment not viable 
Global Multinational subsidiary, DunnHumby lacks interest from acquirers at 
the price initially anticipated by Tesco – DunnHumby divestment not viable 
 
Thailand 
and 
Malaysia 
Thai business includes a Real Estate Investment Trust so ownership 
structure is complicated – additional pressure to retain the Thai business 
Spatial proximity and synergy of Thailand and Malaysian businesses – 
logical to retain the two subsidiaries together 
Long term growth prospects positive in Thailand and Malaysian 
businesses – logical to retain the two subsidiaries together 
 
 
 
